

Recalibrating South Africa's Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Processes in Africa

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Introduction

South Africa's story as an emerging donor, and an increasing force to reckon with in development partnerships and enterprises, particularly in conflict and post-conflict countries is increasingly being recognized by scholars as well as members of the international community. While this is work in progress, there is no doubt that out of the 54 African states, the country has taken a lead role in pursuing the objectives of achieving and sustaining peace in a number of African countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being one of the recipients of such partnerships. The growing involvement of South Africa as a development partner in Africa is not surprising given that it is one of the biggest economies in Africa. According to the World Bank², South Africa is currently the second-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, following Nigeria, and it contributes more than 21 percent of the region's gross domestic product. Thus, relatively speaking, South Africa is characterized by economic, political, and military might, compared with several African countries. Not only is South Africa influential in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), but it also plays a huge political and economic role in the continent. As a result of its unique position, South Africa has been increasingly refining its development assistance outlook, particularly toward African states, and especially conflict and post-conflict states. In fact, South Africa is increasingly playing important roles in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes, and has been among the key international actors in countries such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Madagascar, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, among others.

The South African Development Assistance Architecture

South Africa's architecture for development assistance comprises a number of initiatives. These include the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) established in 2001, which has a mandate from the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act. The ARF Act provided for the establishment of the ARF, whose purpose is to promote international cooperation within the African continent, enhance African renewal, pursue South African foreign policy objectives and ultimately strategically position the role of South Africa in the continent. The ARF Act enables the South African government to provide funding through loans, grants, and technical support to African countries and institutions in various areas, including democracy and governance, the prevention and resolution of conflict, humanitarian assistance, and human resources capacity development.³

Other policy documents that guide South Africa's post-conflict reconstruction role in Africa include the 2011 White Paper, which indicates that the country will continue to play significant roles in supporting peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding roles in Africa.⁴ The White Paper also highlights that South Africa will work closely with international, continental, and regional institutions, in supporting peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding initiatives on the continent. In particular, the White Paper identifies the United Nations Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security as critical institutions that will help South Africa in achieving this objective. In practice, South Africa has been working closely with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),⁵ whose secretariat is located in Midrand, Johannesburg to advance the country's post-conflict reconstruction agenda in Africa. South Africa has played a key role in developing NEPAD and its various sectoral strategies, and has also taken the lead in developing the NEPAD Implementation Strategy of South Africa (NISSA), a country-specific action plan that outlines how South Africa will support the vision and mission of this continental strategy. South Africa has also played a key role in supporting (ASI), a process launched by the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Development Division and the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Driven by the motto "Africa helping Africa,"⁶ the objective of the ASI is to promote African solidarity, mutual assistance, and regional integration, and to facilitate sustainable peace and development. Within the framework of the ASI, South Africa has played an important role in strengthening the capacities of civilians in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes.⁷

In order to ensure that the ARF has a clear program, the South African government adopted the ARF Strategic Plan (2015-2020)⁸ and an ARF Annual Performance Plan (2016- 2017). The ARF falls under the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which is essentially the coordinating mechanism. Currently, South Africa does not seem to have a centralized coordinating and implementation organization for its development assistance in post-conflict societies.

While developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom have institutions such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department for International Development (DFID) respectively, South Africa has yet to establish such coordinating aid infrastructure. The ARF Strategic Plan indicates the need to create a South African International Development Partnership Agency, aimed at harmonizing its development strategy.⁹ It is envisaged that SAIDPA would then manage what will be known as the South African Development Partnership Fund.¹⁰

The director-general of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, who also runs the ARF, is a member of the advisory committee that makes recommendations to the minister of International Relations and Cooperation on governance and management of development aid programs as well as on disbursement of funds. Since the ARF is a public agency, according to South African laws, it is managed in the same manner that public funds are managed. In this case, the Public Funds Management Act (2009) provides guidelines on governance of public funds. The activities of the ARF are carried out by an advisory committee, consisting of officials appointed by the minister of international relations and cooperation and the minister of finance from their respective departments¹¹, with the director-general of DIRCO acting as the accounting officer of the fund. The director-general is required to keep records of the fund's finances and issue annual reports. However, it is important to note that the ARF is currently being run like an agency. Though it is the most visible and most documented development aid institution for South Africa, the ARF accounts for a small percentage of the overall foreign aid that South Africa provides. South Africa also channels its post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding support to Africa through other government departments, although these data are difficult to find since they are not publicly shared, as is required by the ARF Act. In addition, South Africa's multinational companies—which include mobile companies such as MTN and Vodacom, and retail industries such as Woolworths, as well as the mining industry—play a role in the country's post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. For instance, South African mobile companies, such as MTN, were critical to providing support for the Africa Union's response to the Ebola epidemic.¹² Although these companies are not explicitly saying they are engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts, they were definitely coordinating with the African Union in the Ebola initiative. It is not clear whether these companies consult with the South African government, but what is clear is that the chairperson of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who is a South African, was able to appeal to South African private-sector actors to be actively involved in supporting the AU's efforts.

South Africa's role in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa has ranged from supporting democratic transition processes and financing election observation missions to supporting economic recovery processes.

For example, during 2009-2010, the ARF provided funding of 4 million ZAR to allow the South African delegation to participate in the AU Election Observer Mission (AUEOM) to the Sudan general elections, ZAR 24 million toward deployment of a Cuban Medical Brigade in Sierra Leone, ZAR 3 million toward establishment of the African Ombudsman Research Centre (AORC), and ZAR 300 million toward the Zimbabwe Economic Recovery Programme. During the 2010-2011 financial year, the ARF provided ZAR 4 million funding to support elections in Sudan. In 2011-2012, the ARF provided ZAR 10 million in humanitarian assistance to Somalia, ZAR 6.5 million to Lesotho, ZAR 7.5 million to Burundi and ZAR 125.2 million for electoral assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).¹³ And during 2014-2015, the ARF assistance involved ZAR 11 million in budgetary support to Seychelles, ZAR 17 million each to electoral support to Madagascar and the AU and SADC electoral observation missions.¹⁴

Critical appraisal of South Africa’s role in post-conflict reconstruction in Africa

Even though the South African development assistance architecture is still evolving, there are notable patterns and priorities that can already be identified. The first is the African-centered nature of South’s Africa’s role in PCRD. In fact, South Africa’s aid practices are significantly influenced by geographic considerations, as well as by proximity and historical factors. In fact, the White Paper on Foreign Policy acknowledges that, “South Africa therefore accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent; working with countries of the South to address shared challenges of underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice.”¹⁵ South Africa’s assistance in PCRD processes is often directed toward developing countries and is almost entirely given to other African states. The 2011 White Paper notes that South Africa’s foreign policy is “currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community; commitment to South-South cooperation; the centrality of multilateralism.”¹⁶ Thus, South Africa prefers providing its development assistance mostly to neighboring countries, particularly member states of the South African Development Community.

This state of affairs can be explained by South Africa’s history and the relationship it had with African countries during apartheid. In fact, the newly independent southern African nations played a huge role in confronting the vicissitudes of apartheid by establishing the Frontline States (FLS), which later provided the building block for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which later became the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, it must be noted that South Africa has also given aid to countries in East and Central Africa, e.g., Somalia, South Sudan, Burundi, and the Central African Republic, and to an extent in West Africa, especially in Mali.¹⁷ The support to these particular countries is based on expressed needs, as well as a history of cooperation between these states when South Africa was confronting apartheid.

The reasons for South Africa's support of the Central African Republic and Mali are not clear, but this could be based on the premise that such initiatives would continue to bolster its political position in peace and security matters in the continent.

Second, a critical review of the funds, technical and advisory services in PCRDR, and other forms of support that South Africa has provided to other African countries reveals that South Africa's development assistance to post-conflict countries seems to focus on improving governance, and on local priorities such as conflict prevention, resolution, management, mediation, and peacebuilding work. Most of the projects funded by the ARF target electoral assistance and humanitarian support, as well as the implementation of quick impact projects (QIPS) such as construction or reconstruction of facilities. These are priority areas for South Africa, because many post-conflict countries in Africa want assistance in improving their political processes and in consolidating the peace dividend. The ARF does not seem to have a long-term strategy but rather seems to be influenced by emerging needs, and the existing socioeconomic and political climate.

What is clear is that South Africa would like to have its assistance to post-conflict reconstruction processes in Africa be seen as indicating that it is "doing things differently." This could be the result of South Africa's recognition that the development assistance landscape has been uneven, hierarchical, and not diverse. In demonstrating its African-centeredness and the emphasis on African Renaissance, South Africa supported the Common African Position on the post-2015 agenda and continues to support the African Union's Vision 2063 regarding the U.N.'s Sustainable Development Goals, while advocating for inclusivity and adequate representation. On several occasions, the South African government, using its access to different policymaking circles at the regional, continental, and international level, has pushed for certain policy directions on PCRDR.

Additionally, South Africa's approach reflects a focus on capacity enhancement of state institutions and state capacity to consolidate peace. A good example of South Africa's role in PCRDR efforts is its assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Apart from pushing for the establishment of a more robust and effective peacekeeping force in the DRC (as a member of SADC), i.e., the U. N. Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), South Africa is part of the Tripartite Mechanism on Dialogue and Cooperation in DRC.¹⁸ South Africa's involvement in supporting the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC seeks to build a responsive and capable state, but also to promote the fostering of a social contract between the state and its citizens. As a member of the Tripartite Mechanism, South Africa continues to play a huge role in the DRC through bilateral support in the area of security sector reform, upgrading of DRC military training centers, and the training of military personnel.

South Africa is unapologetic about its focus on peace and security, which is quite different from many other emerging donors that tend to focus on technical assistance, infrastructure development, and other non-political issues. Besides pursuing national interests in the DRC, South Africa has been engaged in sustained involvement in initiatives aimed at bringing peace to the DRC, including the Mandela and Mbeki mediation processes, which culminated in the Sun City Talks, also known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Opportunities and learning curves from South Africa's Experience

One of the biggest lessons of South Africa's experience as an emerging donor or development partner has been the development of African-centered solutions to peace and security. South Africa has emerged as one of the few African countries that have dedicated institutions that provide support to other African countries for PCRD. Although many view South Africa's relative economic and political well-being as the reason why it has been able to be a successful development partner, this is not the only reason. There are countries such as Nigeria, whose economies are larger than South Africa's, which have not made similar investments in supporting PCRD processes. So, it seems that there is a deliberate policy direction by South Africa to support other African nations, perhaps because of vested interests in ensuring that regional conflicts do not have spillover effects, and because of the perceived political gains such development partnerships bring.

Furthermore, South Africa's role in development assistance and development cooperation is deeply rooted in an understanding of the interconnectedness of African countries, and the recognition of the imperative of mutual dependence. In fact, South Africa's 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy highlights the concept of "Ubuntu" (human kindness) as providing an overarching guidance to how South Africa engages with other countries, particularly in Africa.¹⁹ The concept of "Ubuntu" emphasizes interdependency, collaboration, and demonstration of the humanity of others. In the context of South African development cooperation, it underscores how South Africa's national interests are tied to the positive development of others'. Furthermore, in using the concept of "Ubuntu," South Africa frames its development assistance as cooperation and partnership rather than as seeing itself as a "donor." The careful use of language that stresses cooperation and collaboration is based on the recognition that South Africa needs to continue being perceived as a fellow African country and ally, rather than as a regional superpower.

Another characteristic of South Africa's role in post-conflict reconstruction processes is the openness of the government to work with civil society organisations (CSOs), especially South African CSOs, in supporting efforts aimed at bringing peace in the selected African countries. In many cases, when the South African government provides funding, material, or technical support, it works very closely with local organizations as well as with South African CSOs.

This is also in contrast to other emerging donors, most of whom focus on assistance to the government rather than to civil society actors.

For example, in Somalia, the South African government disbursed funds to the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and this South African organization was the implementing partner for the ARF project on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Through funding from the ARF, the ACCORD's Somalia Initiative mainly seeks to support peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, working closely with the Federal Government of Somalia, civil society, and other development partners to advance the use of dialogue as a means for promoting reconciliation.²⁰ Additionally, South African training and higher education institutions such as the University of South Africa (UNISA) have also been involved in capacity enhancement of government and civil society actors in South Sudan, as part of the larger strategy to support PCRD efforts.²¹ The engagement in Track II Diplomacy participants has proven to be key in unlocking potential avenues for achieving sustainable peace, as these actors are closer to the ground-level and possess both vertical and horizontal linkages with conflict actors. However, the ARF would need to do more toward ensuring that other African CSOs have information about how to access the funds and development assistance from this institution. The ARF should consider sending open calls for proposals and expressions of interest so that many actors can access this invaluable development support.

South Africa's post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding policies support building a normative policy and institutional environment at the level of the African Union and in Regional Economic Communities (RECs). One example is the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development, which was championed by President Thabo Mbeki during his tenure as Chairman of the organization and which provides African countries with an opportunity to play more prominent roles in peace, security, and development processes.

Partnerships are essential for South Africa as an emerging donor. The 2011 White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy underscores the need to work with the other development partners, including those in the Global North, to establish effective partnerships for improving the world. Indeed, South Africa cooperates with other emerging donors, and since 2010 is a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa coalition (BRICS) and the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund, which was created in 2004. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) by BRICS members during the BRICS Summit in Durban in 2013²² provides an indication of how South Africa seeks to be involved in building partnerships with other emerging economies to ensure that the development environment is visibly transformed. By joining forces with like-minded emerging donors, South Africa strives to transform, restructure, and strengthen the multilateral system into one that is more equitable, balanced, diverse, and reflective of the existence of multiple voices in the international development landscape.

These structures also aim to counteract the marginalization of developing countries in the international development architecture. At the same time, South Africa also values strategic partnerships with traditional donors and development partners. The 2011 White Paper acknowledges the need for cooperation with other donors in the Global North. For example, although the IBSA Fund is an example of trilateral cooperation between developing countries, it works closely with the U.N. system. In fact, IBSA is managed through the United Nations Development Programme. Additionally, South Africa and the European Union (EU) have been strategic partners since 2007, and have collaborated on peace and security issues in the continent.²³ Although there are points of synergy between South Africa and traditional donors in areas such as the DRC, Burundi, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan, in reality, these collaborations are not as salient as would be expected.

The involvement of emerging donors in the PCRD landscape in Africa has also widened the pool of partners for African countries and governments. The competition among development partners in Africa is good for the continent because it reinvigorates debates on the current approaches to aid and development assistance. This will hopefully improve the way development assistance is implemented. Already there are debates about emerging donors changing the international development architecture to less-hierarchical and more-cooperative relationships. Although there are mixed perspectives regarding the role of emerging donors in reshaping the aid architecture, scholars still have begun to look more closely at how emerging donors are shaping development assistance approaches and norms. Hopefully such debate will lead to a more effective development cooperation regime.²⁴

The challenges of South Africa's role as an emerging donor

The role of South Africa as an emerging donor in Africa is not without its challenges. One is the perception of hegemonic tendencies by South African companies, and even by representatives of government in post-conflict settings. While no aid is neutral, critics have posed questions regarding the predominance of national interests vis-à-vis the pursuance of peace and security in Africa. They argue that South Africa is providing assistance as a way to promote its business interests, open up markets for South African firms, and project its leadership on the continent, rather than being a mere expression of the country's interest in supporting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities per se. The existence of numerous South African multinational companies in post-conflict societies in Africa has been used as an indication that there is some truth in this perception. While South Africa might not be able to avoid the label of a regional hegemon, such perceptions might lead to antagonistic relations between the country and its regional and continental neighbours.

A second challenge relating to South Africa's role as an emerging donor has to do with the lack of a development aid coordinating mechanism. A 2008 report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) indicated that, "at least half of all national government departments are engaged in a range of projects on the continent."²⁵ South Africa government departments that directly provide development assistance for PCRD processes include the ministries of defense, education and health, among others. The lack of a coordinating infrastructure for the disbursement of aid efforts to post-conflict reconstruction processes in Africa has meant that South Africa has no central place that can evaluate these efforts and systematically track the assistance. While the proposal to establish the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) has already been made and plans are underway to fully institutionalize this structure, the reality is that current efforts by South Africa in supporting PCRD processes in Africa remain uncoordinated and fragmented. South Africa's multinational corporations (MNCs) also engage in PCRD processes and, in some cases, they do it independently of a well-informed and thought-out strategy that is in sync with the country's foreign policy objectives.

Furthermore, South Africa's current development assistance approach, particularly in PCRD, does seem to be focused on bilateral assistance. Instead of channelling funds through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union, and in particular the Union's PCRD Division, South Africa prefers to work more directly with countries in post-conflict situations. This could be explained by the easier disbursement and accountability processes. Admittedly, South Africa supports NEPAD and works with the AU, SADC, and the relevant infrastructures, but when it comes to disbursement of funds and provision of technical support, the much more salient approach has been to directly engage with states. The focus on bilateral relations, as opposed to working directly with regional entities, could be viewed as neglecting the vision of regional integration. However, the reality is that there is a need to support AU and RECs member states just as there is a need to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) so that the peace and security agenda can be easily driven.

Additionally, although, South Africa contributes generously at the official and political-elite level to post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance in Africa, it seems that there is limited public understanding of the need for symbiosis and synergy with fellow African countries. This could be explained by the limited public engagement and outreach by government on how collaboration with Africa is crucial for the country. At the local level, there is limited appreciation of the interconnectedness of South Africa and the rest of the African continent, and this is epitomized by challenges such as the violence against foreign nationals in South Africa. While South African leadership at the strategic level is pursuing the "Ubuntu" agenda, ordinary South Africans are, however, not expressing similar sentiments toward citizens from other African countries.

Yet, people-to-people diplomacy is crucial if South Africa's role in development cooperation in Africa is to be understood, hence the calls for engaging with local-level actors in promoting South Africa's development assistance agenda.²⁶

Recommendations for enhancing South Africa's post-conflict reconstruction role

First, the need for South Africa to focus on how to concentrate its development assistance toward key themes; this cannot be overemphasized. While the role of South Africa as a champion for peace and security in Africa cannot be ignored, it is imperative that the South African government strategically concentrate its development assistance. Focusing on key areas, rather than taking an expansive and ad-hoc approach would help to ensure more effective support for sustainable peace on the continent.

Additionally, South Africa needs to focus on certain geographical regions so that it can have a cohort-based approach in its development assistance. While this policy brief acknowledges that the bulk of South Africa's development assistance goes toward SADC, in some cases South African aid also is directed to countries outside of Southern Africa. Understandably, South Africa might not want its influence to be limited to the SADC region, hence the approach of an Africa-wide PCRD support initiative. However, as the aid architecture of South Africa is still evolving, there might be a need to start with the proverbial "low-hanging fruit" before reaching out to those countries that are far afield. This is more likely to yield positive and strategic outcomes for South Africa's foreign policy.

Furthermore, South Africa's role in development assistance for post-conflict reconstruction processes could also be enhanced if the country continues to work closely with the relevant normative frameworks and mechanisms at the continental and regional level. That South Africa acknowledges the need to work with the U.N., AU, and regional mechanisms in the promotion of peace and security in Africa is undeniable. Nonetheless, there is a need to scale up these efforts so that South Africa can visibly support the overarching frameworks under which post-conflict reconstruction takes place. The ARF and the yet-to-be-fully-established SADPA should therefore engage with the African Union PCRD Division, and should seek to strengthen the AU's African Solidarity Initiative. By working in tandem with continental and regional initiatives for post-conflict peacebuilding processes, South Africa will ultimately also ensure that its strategies for driving the post-conflict agenda in Africa are rooted in informed international and continental debates on promoting sustainable peace.

South Africa's role as an emerging donor or development partner can also be enhanced if the country considers working closely with other development partners focusing on PCRD in Africa. Improving development partners' collaboration can avoid duplication and also promote a collaborative approach and the recognition of each donor's comparative advantage.

By becoming a part of the aid architecture that currently exists in the post-conflict reconstruction landscape in Africa, South Africa would further advance its place, while learning from other partners. For example, in Somalia, there are numerous donors involved in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes—including Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom, among others—although there is no evidence of tacit and meaningful engagement among these players. Going forward, South Africa will need to explore strategies for engaging with such donors so that experiences can be shared, lessons learned, and burdens collaboratively shared. Working in isolation would likely promote “development partner shopping” by recipients of donor funds. However, when donors cooperate, they can share notes on the forms of assistance that they are giving to the recipients’ partners to avoid instances where the same country could be receiving huge amounts of aid from different donors to undertake the same initiatives.

Admittedly, the challenges of donor collaboration have been noted in extant literature, including the lack of appetite by donors who seek to fly their flag and the challenges of managing pooled donor funds. However, there are definitely other ways that donors can cooperate and collaborate beyond the pooling of donor funds. These include donor consultations and review meetings as well as donors sharing information and experiences. South Africa has participated in some reviews of its development assistance, though these are usually undertaken by civil society organizations and think tanks. Examples include the review of the trilateral assistance model for development cooperation, which was undertaken by the Institute for Global Dialogue, a South African NGO.²⁷ The coordination and collaboration of donors and the overall aid architecture can be strengthened if development partners nurture a culture of reflection, critical review, and introspection.

Conclusion

South Africa role as an emerging donor and development partner is still evolving. Nonetheless, there are significant highlights and lessons that have already been learned. One lesson is that African governments have the capacity and wherewithal to drive the PCRDA agenda in Africa, and they bring a different outlook to the mostly externally driven project of post-conflict reconstruction processes in the continent. However, another lesson is that the institutional architecture for development assistance has not yet been sufficiently calibrated. Furthermore, the theory of change and specific approach of South Africa in post-conflict reconstruction processes is not as salient as would be needed. However, what has really been a key insight is that as a country in Africa, the environment where conflict is taking place, South Africa cannot afford to be a bystander. The achievement of sustainable peace in countries in the neighborhood as well as in other regions of Africa will ultimately benefit South Africa’s national interests, be they economic, political, or security in nature.

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² The IMF report notes that South Africa has fallen from being the second-largest economy in Africa to the third-largest economy, owing to a number of factors, including a combination of external factors such as reduced commodity prices, weak business conditions, difficult labor relations, and tightening borrowing conditions, as well as domestic factors such as political instability, conflict, and electricity shortages-, which cumulatively slowed down economic growth. For details, see: (<https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2016a/Global-Economic-Prospects-January-2016-Sub-Saharan-Africa-analysis.pdf>).

³ For details, see: African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act, <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68220>.

⁴ Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, May 13, 2011. (http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf).

⁵ The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an African Union initiative. NEPAD was adopted by the African Heads of State and Government, and it is based on a common vision of the need to eradicate poverty and to place African countries and the continent on the path toward sustainable growth and development.

⁶ For details, see the Draft Concept for Meeting to Formulate the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) Roadmap. "African Solidarity Initiative for the Mobilization of Support for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa," October 2012 (<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/concept-note-roadmap-meeting-en.pdf>).

⁷ For details, see ACCORD. "South Africa's Cooperation and Support to Civilians in the Aftermath of Conflict," 2014 (<http://accord.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ACCORD-Report-South-Africas-Cooperation-and-Support-to-Civilian-Capacities-in-the-Aftermath-of-Conflict.pdf>).

⁸ For details, see the African Renaissance Fund Strategic Plan and ARF Annual Performance Plan, 2016-2017. (http://www.dfa.gov.za/departament/african_renaissance2015_2020/arf_2015_2020.pdf).

⁹ Since 2007, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) has been in the process of being established as a mechanism to better coordinate outgoing development assistance.

¹⁰ Besharati, Neissan. “South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Africa?” SAIIA Economic Diplomacy Programme Research, Report 12, 2013.

¹¹ The Advisory Committee includes the director general of foreign affairs, three members nominated by the minister of foreign affairs, and two members nominated by the minister of finance. Adapted from a paper by SAIIA, 2008: For details, see: Braude, Wolfe, Pearl Thandrayan, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. “Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The Case of South Africa,” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2008.

¹² For details, see Gareth van Zyl. “MTN donates \$10 million towards Ebola fight,” November 13, 2014 (<http://www.fin24.com/Tech/News/MTN-donates-10m-towards-Ebola-fight-20141113>).

¹³ Please note that at the time of writing this policy brief, 1 USD was equal to 14.35 South African Rand (ZAR). For further insights on the South African disbursements toward PCRD support, see “Details and costs of all projects funded by the African Renaissance Fund in the 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13, and 2014/15 financial years.” (<http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2014pq/pq1960.html>).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ For details, see: DIRCO. Building a Better World. (http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf).

¹⁵ Quote from Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Madame Maite Nkoana-Mashabane: “South Africa has always regarded African as a centrepiece of its foreign policy, and mobilising a significant amount of our resources towards the socio-economic awakening of our continent, peace-making and peace-building, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development.” “Peace, Security Important to African Agenda.” South African Government News Agency, September 4, 2012. (<http://www.sanews.gov.za/world/peace-security-important-african-agenda>). See also, DIRCO. Building a Better World.

¹⁷ Hendricks, Chery and Amanda Lucey. “South Africa and South Sudan: Lessons for post-conflict development and peacebuilding partnerships.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Policy Brief 49 (ISS, Pretoria), 2013.

¹⁸ The Tripartite Mechanism for Dialogue and Cooperation comprises Angola, South Africa, and Tanzania. For details, see: “Final Communiqué: Tripartite Summit,” Department for International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, Luanda. March 12, 2013.

¹⁹ For details, see: DIRCO. Building a Better World.

²⁰ See African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (<http://www.accord.org.za/somalia-initiative/>).

²¹ Hendricks, Cheryl and Amanda Lucey. “South Africa and South Sudan: Lessons for post-conflict development and peacebuilding partnerships.” Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief, (ISS, Pretoria) 2013 (<https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief49.pdf>).

²² The NDP was formally opened in July 2015. Legal procedures for the establishment of the New Development Bank were completed in March 2016, with the NDB Headquarters being Shanghai, China. The NDB is busy establishing its Africa Regional Centre in Johannesburg. (<http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/Brics-Development-Bank-opens-080316.htm#.V4iw77HZbiU#ixzz4ETCrAYrk>).

²³ See the SA-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan (<http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/saeubi-lateral/docs/jap%20-%20final%20-%20signed%20copy.pdf>); and the Joint Press Release of the 13th South Africa- European Union Ministerial Political Dialogue held on February 26, 2016, Pretoria, South Africa (http://eeas.europa.eu/south_africa/docs/south-africa_en.pdf).

²⁴ Manning, Richard. “Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change the Face of International Co-operation?” *Development Policy Review*, 24 (4), 2006, 371-385.

²⁵ Braude, Wolfe, Pearl Thandrayan, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance*, 5.

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